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600 IN BJ: FLUay [67 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 11116. In Bank. Nov. 6, 1967.] 
In re WARREN ELWOOD FLUERY on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Prisons and Prisoners-Parol~Fixing Term of Imprisonment 
-.Jail Time.-A man jailed under an Adult Authority order 
suspending, canceling or revoking parole is not "an escape and 
f~tive" within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 3064, relating to 
the effect of such suspension or revocation, and such jail time 
must be credited as time served; such rule applies equally to 
time spent in jail while the Adult Authority is determining 
whether a prisoner should be reinstated on parole and to time 
spent in jail after the Adult Authority has decided to return 
him to state prison and is arranging to transport him there. 
(Overruling contrary holding in In re Payton, 28 Ca1.2d 194, 
196 [169 P.2d 361] and disapproving the contrary implication in 
In re Hall, 63 Ca1.2d 115, 117 [45 Cal.Rptr.133, 403 P.2d 349]). 
[2] Id.-Parol~Fixing Term of Imprisonment-Jail Time: 0$-
inal Law-Punishment-Oomputation of Time.-Where one on 
parole from state prison was jailed in October for a misde-
meanor offense, then had his parole canceled in December by 
the Adult Authority and ordered returned to prison, and was 
so returned from jail the following March, he was entitled to 
credit, as time served, for the period from October to Decem-
ber because he was still on parole, from December to March as 
it was jail time pending his return to prison after an Adult 
Authority order canceling his parole, and for the whole period, 
October to March, because the misdemeanor sentence was 
silent as to, and therefore concurrent with, his prison sentence 
(Pen. Code, § 669). 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Order to show cause discharged; writ denied. 
Warren Elwood Fluery, in pro. per., and Robert C. Ander-
son, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Robert R. Granucci 
and Horace Wheatley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Re-
spondent. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Prisons and Prisoners, § 128; Am. Jur. , Par-
don, Reprieve and Amnesty (1st ed § 93): 
iricK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Prisons and Prisoners, § 14; Crim-
inal Law, § 1483. 
) 
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[8'l C.2<l 800: 63 Cal.Rptr. 298. 432 P.2d 988] 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner, an inmate of San Quentin 
Prison, applied for a writ of habeas ~orpus on the ground that 
the Adult Authority improperly refused him credit on his 
prison term for tiine spent in jail. The allegations of his peti-
tion and the Summary of Sentence Data prepared by the 
Department of Corrections showed that contrary to In re Pat-
to'n, 225 Cal.App.2d 83, 87 [36 Cal.Rptr. 864], he was not 
credited for time served under a misdemeanor sentence that 
ran concurrently with his prison sentence and that contrary 
t.o Aguilera v. Califorwia Dept. of Oorrections, 247 Cal.App.2d 
150, 153 [55 Cal.Rptr. 292], he was not credited for time.in 
jail under the restraint of Adult Authority orders. The 
alleged facts also gave rise to the question, expressly left open 
in Aguilera, whether a prisoner jailed under an Adult 
Authority order suspending or cancelling his parole and 
directing his return to prison can be denied credit for his time 
in jail on the theory that he was returned to prison without 
unreasonable delay. 
We issued an order to show cause. Respondent warden filed 
his return showing. that petitioner has now been credited with 
the disputed periods of jail time. Although the issuance of our 
order to show cau..c;:e has resulted in this petitioper's receiving 
the relief he applied for, we deem it appropriate in our super-
vision of the administration of criminal justice to decide the 
questions he presented. Petitions for habeas corpus filed by 
. -other prisoners indicate that sentences are still being com-
puted contrary to the holdings of Patto'n and Aguilera, and 
the question expressly undecided by Aguilera is a recurring 
problem important to other prisoners and the Adult Author-
ity. (See D. I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior C01trt, 60 Cal.2d 
723, 731, fn. 5 [36 Cal.Rptr. 468, 388 P.2d 700] ; County of 
Madera v. Gendron, 59 Ca1.2d 798, 804 [31 Cal.Rptr. 302, 382 
P.2d 342, 6 A.L.R.3d 555] ; Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. Depart-
ment of Employme'nt, 56 Cal.2d 54, 58 [13 Cal.Rptr. 663, 362 
P.2d 487] ; In re Newber'n, 55 Cal.2d 500, 505 [11 Cal.Rptr. 
547, 360 P.2d 43] ; America'n Civil L10erties U'nio'n v. Board 
. of Educatio'n, 55 Cal.2d 167, 181 [10 Cal.Rptr. 647, 359 P.2d 
45,94 A.L.R.2d 1259].) 
Petitioner is serving a prison sentence for second degree 
burglary (maximum term 15 years: Pen. Code, § 461) that 
began September 5, 1958. In 1961 the Adult Authority 
released him on parole. On April 12, 1962, it cancelled his 
parole and ordered. his return to prison. For seven days, until 
, . 
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his return to prl~on on April 19, he was held in jail as a 
parole violator ordered returned to prison. 
In 1963 petitioner was again paroled. On September 3, 
1965, the Adult Authority suspended his parole and ordered 
his return to prioon. He was at large for four days after the 
making of the order of September 3. From September 7, 1965, 
until March 10, 1966, he was in jail as a parole violator. Also 
during this time, under the name Howard Emerson Ellwood, 
he was tried for and c.onvicted of possessing narcotics, 
granted probation, and from December 1, 1965, to March 1, 
1966, was held in Jail as a condition of probation as well as 
under the order of the Adult Authority. On March 10 he was 
removed from jail to state prison. 
In May 1966 petitioner was again paroled. In October 1966, 
under the name Howard Emerson Ellwood, he was convicted 
of attempted burglary and sentenced to one year in the 
county jail. On December 28, 1966, while he was serving this 
jail sentence, the Adult Authority cancelled his parole and 
ordered his return to prison. On March 16, 1967, he was 
returned to prison. 
At the time petitioner applied for habeas corpus the Adult 
Auth~rity had computed all the time he spent in jail as "at 
large ,', . time not credited on his 1958 sentence. Penal Code 
section 3064 provides that" From and after the suspension or 
revocation of th~ parole of any prisoner and until his return 
to custody he shall be deemed an escape and fugitive from 
justice and no part of the time during which he is an escape 
and fugitive from justice shall be part of his term.' , 
Although section 3064 refers to a prisoner's return to cus-
tody, not his return to state prison. we recently stated in 
summary of the substance of the statute that "the time 
between a valid order of suspension and his actual return to 
state prison i~ not credited to his term." (I'll, re Hall, 63 
Cal.2d 115, 117 [45 Cal.Rptr. 133,403 P.2d 389].) Moreover, 
in I'll, re Payton, 28 Ca1.2d 194, 196 [169 P.2d 361], we held 
that "the petitioner was 3. fugitive from justice" and not 
entitled to credit on his prison term for 35 days from the date 
of an order suspending parole and directing that he be 
arrested and retained in custody to the ·date of his actual 
return to prison. I'll, re Payton mistakenly classified the peti-
tioner as a fugitive during the entire 35-day period at issue 
despite the fact that during at least part of that period he 
was in jail both pursuant to the order suspending parole and 
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[67 C.2d 600; 63 Cal.Rptr. 298. 432 P.2d 986] 
[1] For the reasons stated in Aguilera, supra, 247 Cal. 
App.2d 150, we now hold that in computing time served the 
Adult Authority ('annot disregard or add to the prison term 
time spent in actual custody in jail under it,; own orders 
suspending, ~ancelling, or revoking parole. (Accord, In re 
Clark, 254 Cal.App.2d 1 [61 Cal.Rptr. 902].) A man jailed 
under such an order cannot be "deemed an escape and fugi-
tive" from the very body that is restraining him. The con-
trary holding in In re Payton, supra. 28 Cal.2d 194, 196, is 
overruled and the contrary implication in In re Hall, supra, 63 
Cal.2d 115, 117, is disapproved. 
The reasoning of Aguilera applies equally to time spent in 
jail under an Adult Authority order while that body is deter-
mining whether a prisoner should be reinstated on parole and 
to time spent in jail under such an order after the Adult 
Authority has decided to return him to state prison and is 
arranging to transport him there. 
[2] We further hold in accord with In re Patton, supra, 
225 Cal.App.2d b3, 85, 87, that the Adult Authority must 
credit petitioner for the time served in jail under the 1966 
misdemeanor sentence that was silent as to, and therefore con-
current with, his prison sentence. (Pen. Code, § 669.) During 
the first part of that sentence, from its inception in October 
1966 until the Adult Authority's cancellation order of 
December 28, 1966, petitioner was still on parole and therefore 
entitled to credit for that time. (See Ex parte Casey, 160 Cal. 
357, 358 [116 P. 1104].) When the Adult Authority cancelled 
his parole, he did not become a fictional fugitive; he is enti-
tled to credit for the jail time served from December 28, 1966, 
t.o March 17, 1967, both for the reasons stated in Patton and 
for the reasons stated in Aguilera. 
Since the Adult Authority's records will disclose whether 
prisoners were in fact at large or whether they were in actual 
custody outside -a prison pUt'Suant to orders suspending or 
cancelling parole, questions of credit for time in jail like those 
raised here can be settled by the Adult Authority without 
requiring prisoners to resort to the courts to obtain correction 
of the computations of their sentences. (Cf. In re Portwood, 
236 Cal.App.2d 321,324 [45 Cal.Rptr. 862].) 
The order to show cause is discharged and the petition for 
habeas corpus is dismissed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
